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Abstract—The leakage of confidential information (e.g. indus-
trial secrets, patient records and user credentials) is one of the
risks that have to be accounted for and mitigated by organizations
dealing with confidential data. Unfortunately, assessing confiden-
tiality risk is challenging, particularly in the presence of cross-
organization cooperation, like in the case of outsourcing. This is
due to the complexity of business networks. This paper presents
an IT-architecture based method for assessing and comparing
confidentiality risks of IT-based business networks from the
perspective of one of the organizations in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, most data exchange within a business and
across businesses takes place electronically and such data
often contains confidential information, e.g. personal records,
client information, and financial data. Loss of confidential
information often results in economical damage, both for the
business and for the data owner (see e.g. [13], [11], [6]).
Intuitively, confidentiality loss can take place in two ways:
(1) misuse by an authorized user: for example when someone
who has access to industrial data sells this data to a competitor;
(2) misuse by an unauthorized user: when someone (be it an
insider or an outsider of the company in question) manages to
gain access to data he should not have access to; for instance
by hacking the system from the outside, or by managing to
overrule the internal access control system.
While (1) should not be neglected by security officers, in
this paper we focus on (2), i.e. on confidentiality leakages
that are created by overruling the ICT system in one way or
another. This is the kind of confidentiality risk that can be
mitigated by using a well-designed and well-maintained sys-
tem. However, even the best and most expensive ICT systems
cannot guarantee complete security w.r.t. confidentiality risks,
and the goal of security officers is to strike the right balance
among security, costs, and system usability. To this end, they
can refer to well-established standards and best practices such
as ISO 17799 [9], NIST 800-30 [2] and COBIT [3]; these
standards help them to assess and mitigate the confidentiality
risk their infrastructure is exposed to.
IT (confidentiality) risk assessment becomes particularly
challenging in the presence of cross-organizational coopera-
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tions, e.g. outsourcing. Companies cooperate increasingly by
connecting together their IT-architectures and granting to each
other’s employees access rights to each other’s confidential
information. IT-enabled business networks increase the com-
plexity of IT-confidentiality risk assessment because one has to
deal with a more complex IT-architecture and with an extended
set of potential threats. For example, in case of outsourcing,
threats can originate not only from within the outsourcing
client (the organization that buys the outsourced services), or
from outside the organization, but also from the outsourcing
provider (the organization that provides outsourcing services).
The fundamental problem of confidentiality is that it is not
possible to monitor it the way that, for example availability
can be monitored. It is not possible to monitor all possible
attackers of a system to see if they acquire access to confi-
dential data. In the case of business networks, this translates
into the following problem: it is not possible for any party
p in the network to monitor the employees of all parties in
the network to see if they access confidential data of p that
they are not authorized to access. Our solution to this problem
is architecture-based: instead of monitoring confidentiality
breaches, we analyze the networking architecture to assess the
risk of confidentiality breaches.
The Confidentiality Risk Assessment and Comparison
(CRAC) method, presented in this paper, assesses confiden-
tiality risks by analyzing the networking architecture. In our
earlier work [15] we developed an architecture-based method
for assessing confidentiality risk within one company. This
however does not consider business network related aspects,
e.g. the outsourcer as a threat. Therefore, we here present a
method that is able to provide decision support by allowing
comparison of confidentiality risk of different architectures,
especially for building networked cooperations, and changing
an existing network.
CRAC is developed to support confidentiality risk assess-
ment for outsourced services (though it can be used also in
standard architectures), and is based on combining the new
concept of information paths with a simplified version of
attack paths [17], [14], [16], [12], [5]. Information paths are
used to model how data can flow to unauthorized users, while
attack paths are used to model how attackers may be able to
penetrate into the system.
We validated the feasibility of the CRAC-method by ap-
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Fig. 1. Alternative access paths to Managed Services using two alternative IT-architectures that are under investigation.
plying it to a read world case. In addition we evaluate the
performance of the method based on the success criteria that
we extract from the goals of the stakeholders. The method
improved confidentiality risk assessment at networked organi-
zations.
The structure for the rest of this paper is as follows: in
Section II we give the industrial context in which we utilize
the CRAC-method;CRAC-method in Section III we introduce
the CRAC-method and illustrate how we applied it to the
industrial context; in Section IV we present validation results;
in Section V we compare the CRAC-method with the most
widely known risk assessment methods and give some future
directions.
II. INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT
In this section we first briefly describe the industrial context
of the case, the stakeholders, their goals and the success
criteria.
A. Case Description
A big sized multinational electronics manufacturing com-
pany is outsourcing the management of its authentication and
authorization services to a multinational IT service provider.
(From here on we will refer to the electronics company as
the Company, the outsource supplier as the Outsourcer and
the authentication and authorization service to be delivered
by the Outsourcer as the System.) The System is used by
the Company’s employees to access the Company’s data and
services, and by the employees of the Outsourcer for delivering
additional outsourced IT services, which we refer to as the
Managed Services.
The system contains data at three different confidentiality
levels: highly confidential, confidential and public. For in-
stance, user credentials are considered private and are clas-
sified as highly confidential; business information and access
control lists are considered critical and are classified as con-
fidential. Confidentiality levels determine who is authorized
to access the data. In this case, user credentials should be
accessed only by the data owner, while business information
and access control lists should be accessed only by those
employees of the Company and of the Outsourcer who need
to access it to fulfill their duties and should be unaccessible
to others.
The company is considering to replace the IT-architecture
that the System is currently built on with the alternative IT-
architecture proposed by the Outsourcer. Our goal is to analyze
and compare these architectures w.r.t. the confidentiality risk.
These alternatives are illustrated (simplified) in Figure 1,
which also shows the access paths that can be followed by the
Outsourcer employees to get access to the Company’s systems.
The first architecture (Alternative 1 in Figure 1) is the
one proposed by the Outsourcer. It comprises a single access
path used by all employees of the Outsourcer for reaching
the Managed Services. All access attempts to the Managed
Services are monitored by the session directory services. The
terminal server makes necessary applications available on
the terminals of the employee of the Outsourcer. The secure
gateway (1), which is installed on the third party gateway
(TPG) of the Company, is mainly responsible for authenti-
cating the Outsourcer employees to the Managed Services.
The presentation server is used by the (authorized) Outsourcer
employees as interface for the management of applications.
The second Architecture (Alternative 2 in Figure 1) is
the IT-architecture that is currently in use. Compared to
Alternative 1, it contains an second access path with two
further IT-components: the stepping stone portal and the
stepping stone server. These IT-components allow a special
group of the Outsourcer employees to access the Managed
Services in emergency cases. While the first path uses strong
authentication, the second path uses IP based authentication.
Furthermore, in alternative 2, the secure gateway is located in
the intranet of the Company and not in the demilitarized zone,
as in alternative 1.
B. Stakeholders and Their Goals
Following the problem-solving approach proposed by
Wieringa [20], we first make an inventory of the stakeholders
and their goals.
The stakeholders involved in this case study are two busi-
ness units of the Company: the Global Infrastructure (GI) and
the Risk, Performance & Compliance Unit (RMC).
GI is the owner of the System. It requests RMC to assess
the risks of all new or updated IT systems. With respect to this
case, GI requires to know which of the two IT-architectures is
more robust to confidentiality breaches. GI then determines the
business impact of confidentiality breaches, which in this case
depends on (a) the criticality of information, (b) the number of
records that get disclosed, and (c) to whom they get disclosed
to.
RMC is responsible for assessing the risks and compliance
requirements of the IT systems. At present, RMC uses a tool
supporting models developed within the Company for this
purpose. (From here on, we will call this the RA method.) The
RA method consists of two parts: (1) Business Impact Analysis
and (2) Threat and Vulnerability Analysis. According to RMC,
although the RA method is practical, the results it delivers
are based too much on the subjective opinion of the risk
assessors. Furthermore, it represents the risks as a list of threats
(with impact and likelihood) that cannot be linked to the IT-
architecture. Therefore, the results RA delivers cannot be used
for comparing alternative IT-architectures. RMC expects us to
improve its risk assessment method in the following ways:
(1) make the risk assessment process less subjective; and (2)
change it in such a way that the assessment result allows
comparing different IT-architectures.
C. Solution Criteria
To validate the CRAC-method we determine the following
criteria, which reflect the goals of the stakeholders.
C1: the method should differentiate among threat agents;
C2: the method should take into consideration (when
applicable) the quantitative aspects of confidentiality
breaches, e.g. the number of records that may get
disclosed;
C3: the method should present the risks in a way that
allows comparison of IT-architectures;
C4: the method should be less subjective than the RA
method.
Threat agents are people that intentionally or by mistake access
information assets that they are not entitled to access.
We associate to criteria C1, . . . , C4 the following measures,
which will prove to be useful in the validation phase.
M1: the number of threat agents;
M2: the number of records disclosed by an incident;
M3: the percentage of threats that are linked to IT-
components that belong to the IT-architecture of the
System;
M4: the number of activities that have subjective infor-
mation as input over the total number of activities.
Later in the paper we use these measures to compare the
CRAC-method with the RA to present how they score on these
indicators.
III. THE CRAC-METHOD
As pointed out earlier, the fundamental challenge of confi-
dentiality is that it is not possible to monitor all unauthorized
persons to check if they access things they are not entitled
to. The CRAC-method analyzes the IT-architecture on which
confidential information assets rely to help assessing how hard
it is for unauthorized people to access them. It is built on the
following idea: information is a logical asset so it does not
stay at one place only but can flow. For instance, it could
flow to an IT-component that an attacker can easily reach.
Here, IT-components are components of the IT-architecture,
e.g. applications, operating systems, network segments, and
even physical buildings, that are relevant for an information
security risk analysis.
CRAC analysis consists of four main steps:
Step 0:collecting the basic information from available docu-
mentation and from interviews with the stakeholders;
Step 1:analyzing the path information assets can follow and
modeling them with Information Path Graphs;
Step 2:identifying attack paths that may be followed by
threat agents and modeling them with Attack Propa-
gation Graphs;
Step 3:combining the results of Step 1 and Step 2 to identify
weak spots.
In what follows, we present our application of the CRAC-
method in the Company.
A. Step 0: Collecting Basic Information
In this first step we need to collect the following informa-
tion:
• the list of information assets present on the system;
• the confidentiality level and homogeneity of these infor-
mation assets;
• the IT-components of the IT-architecture of the system;
• logical and physical connections among these IT-
components;
• for each information asset the number of instances (con-
fidential records) that can be retrieved from each IT-
component at once;
• the list of possible threat agents;
• list of vulnerabilities;
• list of competences and conditions.
Information assets are semantic components of an informa-
tion system that is required for an organization to conduct its
mission or business [10]. The CRAC-method considers only
those information assets that are classified by the stakeholders.
Information assets are classified by the confidentiality levels.
Homogeneity indicates whether the number of records that
get disclosed would change the impact of an incident. We call
an information asset homogeneous, if the damage due to its
disclosure can be considered proportional to the number of its
instances that get disclosed. For instance, in a hospital, “patient
records” would probably form an homogeneous information
asset, since the damage due to the loss of a hundred patient
records is in principle a hundred times larger than the damage
due to the loss of one single record. An example of an
information asset that is not homogeneous is the set of access
control credentials, or the set of passwords, since the loss of a
single password can in general cause as much damage as the
loss of a hundred of them.
Threat agents are associated with a set of competences and
conditions (CC). Competences are problem-solving capabil-
ities of people, e.g. hacking skills and system knowledge;
while conditions are owned environmental rights, e.g. physical
access. This reflects the guidelines of NIST SP 800-30 [18],
indicating that the likelihood of a threat agent exercising a sys-
tem vulnerability depends on his competences and conditions.
Threat agents can only carry out a given attack if the available
CCs meet or exceed the required CCs to perform the exploit
[8]. The main CCs analyzed in security literature (see for
instance [7], [14], [19], [8]) are: system knowledge, available
financial and technical resources, hacking skills, and physical
access to the systems. However, a finer-grained risk assessment
is possible with a finer-grained classification of CCs.
Applying Step 0 to the System
As mentioned earlier, the stakeholder GI distinguishes three
confidentiality levels for the information assets (highly confi-
dential, confidential and public), which we translated into three
confidentiality levels: high / medium / low.
In agreement with the stakeholders we consider three threat
agents: the employee, the outsider and the outsourcer; and
three CCs: physical access, system knowledge and hacking
skills.
We constructed a list of vulnerability classes based on the
threat and vulnerability list the Company uses in their RA-
method. Here, for the sake of simplicity we group vulnerabil-
ities in vulnerability classes.
B. Step 1: Constructing IPGs
For each information asset, we build an information path
graph (IPG), which is a graph representing how (part of) this
information asset could leak to one of the threat agents.
Technically, an IPG is a directed graph in which the nodes
represent IT-components containing (part of) the information
asset in question; the directed edges between nodes represent
the possibility for the information asset to flow from one node
to another. In most cases, the IPG will turn out to be a tree
rooted in a database containing the information asset. The
IT-components in the IPG represent the locations where the
information asset could be accessed by a threat agent.
The edges of an IPG are annotated with the maximum num-
ber of records that can be retrieved from the IT-component.
Our model considers two types of edges: those which allow
retrieval of all records at once and those that allow only
a single record to be retrieved at a time. Once the IPG is
ready, we can compute the impact of each IT-component in
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Fig. 2. IPG of user credentials in IT-architecture 2.
it (actually, this is the impact relative to the information asset
the IPG refers to, if an asset occurs in more than one IPG,
then the impacts have to be combined together). The impact
is the loss caused by disclosure of an information asset and
depends on (a) the confidentiality-level, (b) the homogeneity of
the information asset, and (c) the maximum number of records
that can be retrieved at once. The CRAC-method models this
in a qualitative way, as it is commonly done in many risk
assessment methods. The reason is that quantitative values
that reflect the impact are not available in practice, and for
comparing the criticality of IT-components, partially ordered
non-quantitative scales are sufficient.
Summarizing, in this step we build a set of IPGs (one for
each information asset and each alternative IT-architecture).
By merging the impact values of an IT-component in different
IPGs, it is possible to determine its total impact: which is
the cumulative loss caused by disclosure of all confidential
information stored on it. As merge operator, we agreed with
the stakeholders on the • operator defined in I.
Applying Step 1 to the System
To continue our running example, we first show how to
carry out step 1 relative to the information asset user creden-
tials. User credentials are used to authenticate and authorize
employees of the outsourcer to access the Managed Services.
Figure 2 illustrates part of the IPG that models the flow of
TABLE I
BEHAVIOUR OF THE • OPERATOR.
• Very High High Medium Low Very Low Null
Very High Very High Very High Very High Very High Very High Very High
High Very High Very High High High High High
Medium Very High High High Medium Medium Medium
Low Very High High Medium Medium Low Low
Very Low Very High High Medium Low Low Very Low
Null Very High High Medium Low Very Low Null
user credentials according to IT-architecture 2. Notice that the
user credential directory is the information source of this IPG.
Because of confidentiality reasons we show here only those
nodes that are presented in the architecture diagram in Figure 1
and those that do not reveal architectural specifications of the
System.
In the IPG four information flow paths can be recognized:
the leftmost paths represent how the credentials flow from
the user credential directory to the terminal of the special
outsourcer, which is the terminal that the employees of the
Outsourcer with special status may use; the second path shows
the information flow to the terminal of the outsourcer; the
third path shows the flow towards the identity management
application which can be accessed by the employee of the
Company; the last path models the synchronization of the user
credentials in the user credential directory to the identity store.
The confidentiality level of user credentials is high. User
credentials are not homogenous, because depending on the
defined user roles and user groups the impact of disclosing
a user credential varies. Therefore, an IT-component storing
user credentials has high impact, regardless of the quantity of
user credentials it stores.
In Architecture 2, the children of the nodes identity man-
agement application and presentation server can retrieve a
single record at a time. Therefore, in Figure 2 these edges
are annotated with single. The rest of the edges are annotated
with all to indicate that all available instances in the parent
may be retrieved by their child node at once.
To illustrate how we deal with homogeneous information
assets we now sketch the case of the business information
information asset (for the sake of conciseness, we do not
compute the whole IPG for it). The confidentiality level of
business information is medium. One of the IT-components
on the IPG is the secure gateway, which allows only a single
record to be retrieved at once. Therefore, the edges connecting
the secure gateway to its children are annotated with single and
the impact of the IT-components from their information source
up to and including the secure gateway is high, and afterwards
low.
After constructing the IPGs, we calculate the total impact
of each IT-component. If there is more than one information
asset available on an IT-component, then the IT-component
will occur in more than one IPG. We determine the total impact
of that IT-component with the binary operator • on L, where
L = {Very High, High, Medium, Low, Very Low, Null} are
the impact and total impact values. The merge operator • was
agreed on with the Company and is defined in Table I.
Assuming that on the terminal of the special outsourcer only
user credentials and business information are available, then
the total impact of the terminal of special outsourcer according
to the Table I is High.
C. Step 2: Constructing APGs
The second step involves building the attack propagation
graph (APG). This can be seen as the dual of the IPG: while
the IPG models how confidential data can flow from one asset
to the other, the APG models how an attacker could possibly
penetrate into the IT infrastructure. In some cases, the APG
will turn out to be a tree rooted in the IT-component that
constitutes the attack target, such as a database. The leaves
represent the first IT-components that a threat agent can access
on his way to the target.
The CRAC-method involves constructing a different APG
for each threat agent, because each threat agent can follow
a different path according to available CCs. In an APG, we
call such a path from a leaf node to the target node an attack
path. Given a threat agent a, the APG relative to it is built
as follows: first, we add a node to the APG for each IT-
component that can be directly reached by the threat agent
(for external threat agents, we can add a special fictitious
IT-component “the internet”). Then, we iteratively add new
nodes and edges as follows: if node n1 is in the APG and
n1 is connected to the IT-component n2 in the architecture
under examination, then we add n2 to the APG (if it was not
present already) and we add an edge from n1 to n2. We label
this edge with what we call the attack propagation likelihood:
a (qualitative) figure that indicates our estimate of how likely it
is that an attacker who has gained control over n1 will be able
to gain control over n2. In other words, the attack propagation
likelihood gives an indication of the probability that an attacker
will be able to hop from one IT-component to the other. This
value depends on the estimated attacker abilities and on the
estimated vulnerabilities present in the system. Below we show
how we compute them in our case study.
APGs are inspired by attack trees as defined in [17], [8],
[12]. In contrast to classic attack trees, the nodes of an APG
do not represent possible actions that constitute an attack but
they represent IT-components.
In the CRAC-method, an attack propagates based on phys-
ical or logical containment. Every IT-component has a list
of vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers. The
likelihood of such an exploitation, or in other words attack
propagation, is determined based on the available competen-
cies of threat agents and required CCs of vulnerabilities. If an
TABLE II
MAPPING OF VULNERABILITIES OF THE SYSTEM TO REQUIRED CCS.
Vulnerability Physical System Hacking
Classes Access Knowledge Skills
virtual security zones X X
lack of monitoring X X
weak authentication mechanisms X
TABLE III
MAPPING OF THREAT AGENTS IN THE SYSTEM TO CC.
Threat Physical System Hacking
Agents Access Knowledge Skills
Employee X
Outsourcer X X
Outsider X
IT-component has more vulnerabilities, then we consider the
vulnerability with the highest likelihood. In the CRAC-method
the set of capabilities available to an attacker is dynamic. As
a threat agent proceeds through the attack path, i.e. after each
attack propagation, the available resources (capabilities) of that
threat agent may change.
Once we have built all APGs, we can determine the reacha-
bility level of each IT-component, which is equal to the highest
likelihood of the attack paths leading to it.
Summarizing, in this step we build a set of APGs (one
for each threat agent and each alternative IT-architecture) and
determine the attack propagation likelihoods of all possible
attack paths.
Applying Step 2 to the System
To determine the attack propagation likelihoods, we map
vulnerabilities to CCs and CCs to threat agents, together
with the ICT security officer. Table II depicts an example
of mapping vulnerabilities to the required CCs, where X
represents the necessity of CCs to exploit vulnerabilities.
Table III reports an example of CCs mapped to threat agents,
here X represents the availability of CCs to a threat agent.
Then, we calculate the attack propagation likelihood from
one IT-component to a directly connected other IT-component
with the following function.
Ltv =

high, if Cv ⊆ Ct,
medium, if Ct ⊂ Cv but Ct⋂Cv 6= ∅,
low, if Ct
⋂
Cv = ∅.
The function Ltv returns the estimated likelihood of threat
agent t exploiting the vulnerability v. Cv represents the set of
required CCs to exploit a vulnerability, while Ct represents
the set of available CCs of a threat agent.
According to this function, if the set of available CCs of
a threat agent is equal to or exceeds the set of required
CCs of a vulnerability, then that threat agent can exploit that
vulnerability with high likelihood. If the threat agent has only
a non-empty subset of the required CCs, then with medium
likelihood he can exploit the vulnerability. In case there are
TABLE IV
LIKELIHOOD MATRIX IN THE FIRST STEP OF AN ATTACK.
Vulnerability Classes Insider Outsourcer Outsider
virtual security zones low medium medium
lack of monitoring low medium medium
weak authentication mechanisms low low high
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Fig. 3. APG followed by an outsourcer to access the user credentials
according to IT-architecture 2
no common CCs between the required and available sets of
CCs, then the likelihood that he exploits that vulnerability is
low.
Ltv allows to map threat agents to vulnerabilities. Part of
the matrix that displays this mapping in the first step of an
attack is depicted in Table IV.
Finally, we construct the APGs for all alternative IT-
architectures and threat agents.
Figure 3 illustrates the part of the APG that models alter-
native attack paths an outsourcer may follow to access user
credentials stored in the user credential directory, according
to IT-architecture 2. According to this APG, employees of the
Outsourcer may access the Managed Services from two points:
via the terminal of special outsourcer or via the terminal of
the outsourcer. Since an outsourcer has insider CCs for the
IT-components in the Outsourcers premises, the likelihood of
an outsourcer accessing the terminal of the special outsourcer
and terminal of the outsourcer are high.
However, the likelihood of an outsourcer penetrating into
the global network of the Company is medium. This is
explained as follows. The vulnerabilities of the Company’s
global network: virtual security zones, lack of monitoring, and
weak authentication mechanisms. These vulnerabilities require
system knowledge and hacking skills (see Table II). However,
the competences of an outsourcer are limited to physical access
and system knowledge (see Table III); which leads to medium
according to the attack likelihood calculation function given
above.
D. Step 3: Risk Calculation and Comparison
In this step we combine the output of steps 1 and 2 to iden-
tify the weak spots in the system and compare the robustness
of alternative IT-architectures with respect to confidentiality.
We identify the weak spots, which are confidentiality-critical
IT-components, based on their risk which is determined as
follows. Given an IT-component c, by consulting the IPGs we
can compute its total impact ci (as defined in step 1) and
combine it with its reachability level cr (as defined in step 2)
and present it as a pair (ci , cr). Then we sort all pairs by
first grouping together all IT-components with the same total
impact and then sorting them according to their reachability
level in a descending manner. Those IT-components with the
highest total impact and reachability level are the most critical
ones. Furthermore, by comparing the number of assets with
the same risk of different IT-architectures, one can determine
which architecture is more robust w.r.t. confidentiality.
Applying Risk Calculation and Comparison of the System
To continue our running example we first show how we
determine the risk of the terminal of the special outsourcer
for IT-architecture 2.
In step 1 we computed that the total impact value of terminal
of the special outsourcer is high, in step 2 we computed that its
reachability level is high. Thus, the risk vector of the terminal
of the special outsourcer is (high , high). Furthermore, for
IT-architecture 2, we calculate (among others) the risk vector
of the user credential directory, which is (high , medium).
We interpret this as follows: the terminal of the special
outsourcer has a higher risk than the user credential directory,
and therefore, it is more critical. This is because, although the
total impacts are the same, an attacker is less likely to access
the information available on the user credential directory.
By comparing the risk of the IT-components of IT-
architecture 1 and 2, we see that IT-architecture 1 is more
robust than 2. In particular, the risk vector of the stepping
stone server and stepping stone portal are (veryhigh , high)
and they are present only in IT-architecture 2. Furthermore, in
IT-architecture 2 the reachability level of three IT-components
is higher then the reachability level those IT-components in
IT-architecture 1.
IV. VALIDATION
Together with the stakeholders, we have evaluated the
CRAC method. In particular, we have compared it to the RA-
method (which is customarily used by the company) using the
criteria derived in Section II-C. Table V reports a summary of
this comparison.
According to measure M1, the CRAC-method has a finer-
grained approach to the threat agents, compared to the RA-
method. The number of threat agents in the CRAC-method
depends on the requirements of the company and is at least
three, as the RA-method does not differentiate between threat
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF THE CRAC-METHOD WITH THE RA-METHOD
Measure CRAC-method RA-method
M1: number of at least 3 1
threat agents
M2: disclosed number max. number of % of disclosure
of records reachable instances
M3: percentage of threats 100% 20.8%
linked to IT-components
M4: number of activities 19% 57%
with subjective input
agents. The CRAC-method differentiates among threat agents
by determining the attack propagation likelihoods, whereas
the RA-method determines the likelihoods based on a realis-
tic worst-case scenario. Therefore, the CRAC-method fulfills
criterion C1 better than the RA-method.
Both the CRAC-method and the RA-method consider the
amount of disclosure and therefore, fulfill C2. However, in a
different way: for determining the business impact, the RA-
method assigns percentages of disclosure to threats; while the
CRAC-method looks into the number of instances that can be
retrieved at once.
With respect to measure M3, the CRAC-method links all
threats to IT-components, whereas RA-method links only 20%
of them. This allows presenting the effects of alternative IT-
architectures on confidentiality risks and comparing their ro-
bustness. This cannot be done precisely with the RA-method.
According to measure M4, only 3 out of 16 activities of the
CRAC-method use subjective input, while the ratio becomes
4 out of 7 for the RA-method. We conclude that the output of
the CRAC-method depends less on subjective input, and the
CRAC-method fulfills C4 better than the RA-method.
V. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
In this section we present the related work and give some
potential dimensions of improvement for the CRAC-method.
CORAS [4] is a framework for model-based risk assessment
of security-critical systems. It consists of four main compo-
nents:
• a risk documentation framework based on RM-ODP;
• a risk management process based on the AS/NZS 4360;
• an integrated risk management and system development
process based on the Unified Process;
• a platform for tool inclusion based on data-integration
using XML.
CORAS gives detailed recommendations for modeling both
the system and the risk, as well as security controls identified
during the risk assessment. The main aim of the CORAS risk
assessment process is identifying, prioritizing and evaluating
the risk that reduces the value of assets by means of incidents.
We argue that confidentiality risks have to be linked to
the IT-architecture for comparing robustness of alternative
architectures. However, CORAS does not link confidentiality
breaches to IT-components.
A further well-known risk assessment method is the
OCTAVE [1]. It presents a technology-neutral risk evaluation
approach to bridge the gap between an organization’s opera-
tional and IT requirements. The approach is embodied in a set
of criteria that define the essential elements of information
security risk evaluation. With OCTAVE it is possible to
link confidentiality breaches (vulnerabilities) to infrastructural
components. However, OCTAVE analyzes incident likelihood
and impact independent of threat agents, which we believe is
essential for assessing risk in business networks.
In this paper we presented the CRAC-method and how it can
be used (1) for assessing confidentiality risks of an IT-system
that is used in a business network, and (2) for comparing
confidentiality risk levels of alternative IT-architectures on
which systems are built. System owners may use these results
for risk mitigating investment decisions or for specifying
security requirements in terms of weak spots.
In the future we intend to extend CRAC with tool support.
Manually executing some activities of the CRAC-method is
time consuming. As the number of threat agents, vulnerabil-
ities and CCs increases, constructing IPGs and APGs, and
determining the propagation likelihoods may become cumber-
some. Currently, there is no tool supporting the activities of the
method. Therefore, a risk assessor cannot apply it in a practical
way to complex systems. To tackle this, we plan to improve
the way APGs are constructed. We are planning to construct
them first with a tool that automatically generates attack trees,
and then analyze the result manually for completeness.
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